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SEXUAL PRIVACY: ACCESS OF A MINOR TO CONTRACEPTIVES,
ABORTION, AND STERILIZATION WITHOUT PARENTAL
CONSENT
Until recently, a minor's access to ordinary medical treatment and to
such services as contraception, abortion, and sterilization has been se-
verely limited by the legal prerequisite of parental consent. While purport-
ing to act in the minor's best interest, the law has hindered making such
medical care available to minors who need and desire it. However, the law
has been changing; relying on privacy rights as protected by the Constitu-
tion, courts and legislatures have granted independent access-in a selec-
tive and piecemeal fashion-to medical services concerning reproductive
capacity and sexual activity.
This article includes an examination of the problems facing a minor who
desires contraceptives, an abortion, or sterilization. The analysis includes:
first, the historical requirement of prior parental consent and its effect on
the availability of medical treatment to minors; second, the recent recogni-
tion of the federal constitutional right to privacy and its ramifications for
those seeking medical services relating to childbearing; and third, the pres-
ent state of the law concerning a minor's access to contraceptive devices,
abortion, and sterilization without parental consent. The focus is upon the
extension of privacy rights of minors and the accompanying dilution of
parental authority and subordination of the interests of the state.
I. THE AvAiLABIrrY OF MEDIcAL TREATMENT TO MINORS.
The law of torts protects minors as well as adults from unauthorized
invasions of their bodies. The administration of medical treatment without
the patient's consent constitutes a "technical battery"' and exposes the
attending physician to civil liability.2 To be effective, the consent must be
an informed one,' and "it must be given by a person with the requisite legal
capacity."' As a rule, persons below the age of legal majority5 are deemed
1. Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330, 336
(1970).
2. Even such indirect contact as a prescription of medication later used by the patient
constitutes a battery if no legal consent is given. See Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical
Care Decision-Making Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REv. 285, 286
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Bennett].
3. Informed consent must be based on adequate information about the therapy, the avail-
able alternatives, and the collateral risks. Waltz and Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628, 629 (1969).
4. Wadlington, Minors & Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Wadlingtonl.
5. The legal age of majority was fixed by common law at twenty-one.
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to be incapable of giving informed consent; therefore, the law demands
consent by the parents prior to medical treatment of a minor.'
Both common and statutory law have devised exceptions to this doctrine
of parental consent.' Under the common law, when a physician in his
professional judgment deems that immediate steps are necessary to save
the life of a child, he may administer treatment without liability for bat-
tery, notwithstanding his patient's inability to give consent or the lack of
parental consent.' Although this emergency exception is construed nar-
rowly,9 the "willingness of courts to find an emergency appears to increase
as the age of the conscious and consenting child increases."'"
Another exception is the "mature minor" rule." Subjective factors such
as intelligence, maturity, and ability to comprehend the medical proce-
dures and alternatives involved are considered by the courts in determin-
ing whether or not the minor is capable of appreciating the importance of
the decision to consent to treatment.2
6. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260
N.W. 99, 102 (1935); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 102-03 (4th ed. 1971).
Because the parent possesses the authority to consent to the treatment of a minor child, the
mere touching of the child without this consent constitutes a technical battery. Bonner v.
Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99, 102
(1935). This parental consent requirement has been justified on at least two theories: 1) the
often-criticized, feudal notion that children are'the property of their parents, In re Clark, 21
Ohio Op. 2d 86, 88, 185 N.E.2d 128, 131 (1962); and 2) the common law assumption that "a
minor lacks sufficient intelligence, knowledge, and maturity to assess adequately the poten-
tial hazards of medical treatment and to reach a decision in his own best interest." Note,
The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REv. 305,
309 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Minor's Right to Abortion]; see Dixon v. United States,
197 F. Supp. 798, 803 (W.D.S.C. 1961).
7. See generally Dunn, The Availability of Abortion, Sterilization, and Other Medical
Treatment for Minor Patients, 44 U- Mo. KANSAS CrTy L. REV. 1, 2, 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Dunn]; Wadlington, supra note 4; The Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 6.
8. Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106, 1110 (1912); Dunn, supra note 7, at 3;
Wadlington, supra note 4, at 116.
9. In absence of statutes to the contrary, two conditions must exist simultaneously to
enable a physician to successfully raise the defense of an emergency: (1) the patient must be
unable to give consent, and (2) an immediate medical need must exist which necessitates
treatment in order to maintain the life or health of the child. Dunn, supra note 7, at 3.
10. Bennett, supra note 2, at 289. A few states have codified this exception to the common
law rule. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 65-2891(b) (1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112 § 12F (Cum.
Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-21.1 to 90-21.4 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
11. Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 301, 469 P.2d 330,
337 (1970); Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94, 96 (1906); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio
St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25, 34 (1956) (Taft, J., concurring).
12. The Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 6, at 310. Professor Wadlington's research
into the "mature minor" rule reveals several common elements in the cases in which the rule
was applied, Wadlington, supra note 4, at 119: (1) the treatment was undertaken for the
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The emancipation of a minor"3 by parents 4 or by statute'5 is a third
exception to the common law rule requiring parental consent. Indicia of
emancipation include marriage, economic independence, separate resi-
dency, and service in the armed forces."8 Emphasis is placed more on the
acts of release by the parents and the child's actual independence rather
than on the child's judgment or appearance of maturity. 7
These judicially created exceptions have not significantly altered the
availability of medical services to minors without parental consent; rather,
they have provided physicians with possible defenses to tort actions. s
These exceptions alone do not provide an adequate solution for the minor
seeking medical services such as contraceptives, abortion or sterilization.
The legislative response to this problem has helped to mitigate the se-
vere applications of the parental consent rule. Statutes permitting minors
to give consent to specified treatment and health care have been enacted
in virtually every state."9
benefit of the minor rather than a third party, see Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C.
Cir. 1941).; (2) the particular minor was near majority (or at least in the range of fifteen years
upward), and was considered to have sufficient mental capacity to understand fully the
nature and importance of the medical steps proposed, see Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. &
School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330 (1970); and (3) the medical procedure
could be characterized by the courts as &omething less than "major or serious in nature," see
Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 2531 (1956) (Taft, J., concurring).
13. This concept is derived from Roman law whereby a minor is extended essentially all
the legal capacity of persons over the age of majority. Bennett, supra note 2, at 290.
14. See Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contra-
ceptive Controversy, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1001, 1002-03 n.10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The
Contraceptive Controversy], which states that in some instances, where emancipation occurs
with parental consent, it is not an exception to the requirement but merely another form of
parental consent.
15. See Pilpel, Minor's Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L. Rav. 462, 472-87 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Pipel], for a state-by-state analysis of emancipation statutes as of
September 1971, allowing minors to consent to medical treatment in limited circumstances.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32-137(9)(Cum. Supp. 1977) which provides:
Any person under eighteen years of age who is or has been married shall be deemed
as an adult for the purpose of giving consent to surgical and medical treatment and
the consent of his or her parent or guardian to surgical or medical treatment for such
person shall not be required except that in the case of sexual sterilization the consent
of his or her parent or guardian or an order of the juvenile court of the jurisdiction in
which such person resides approving such operation.
16. Pilpel, supra note 15, at 465.
17. Bennett, supra note 2, at 291; see Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753,
757 (1965); Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 21, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (1967).
18. The Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 6, at 310.
19. Id. at 311, citing Pilpel & Wechsler, Birth Control, Teenagers and the Law, FAm.
PLANNING PERSPECrUS 29 (1969). Some legislatures have codified common law exceptions
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The issue becomes one of determining the amount of discretion to be
placed with the minor patient and the medical profession."0 The courts and
legislatures must balance the end of providing adequate medical treatment
against the important consideration of shifting discretionary power from
the parent to the child and the doctor. 21 On balance, the benefits which
would come from allowing greater access by minors to medical care have
tipped the scales in favor of abolishing or limiting restrictions to medical
care which are based on age Where a minor's right to sexual privacy is
involved.
H. THE RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY.
The Supreme Court has proceeded cautiously in its recognition of those
adult activities which are encompassed within the right of privacy since
their decision in Griswold v. Connecticut." The extension of the privacy
such as the emergency exception with regard to minors, the "mature minor" rule, and limited
emancipation of minors for the purpose of consenting to medical treatment. Wadlington,
supra note 4, at 120-21. In addition, some state statutes permit minors to consent to treatment
for specified health purposes such as venereal disease, drug addiction and rehabilitation,
pregnancy, birth control, or family planning. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32-137(6), (7) (Cum.
Supp. 1977). Many legislatures have recognized that there may be no communication be-
tween parent and child on sensitive subjects and that reluctance to seek parental consent may
prevent a minor from obtaining medical care related to drug use or sexual activity. Wadling-
ton, supra note 4, at 122. Legislation enabling minors to obtain medical care without approval
of their parents acknowledges not only that unhampered access may be in the minor's best
interests but also that it serves the public interest by providing adequate health care for all
persons, limiting the spread of disease, and preventing unwanted pregnancies. Ballard v.
Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 880, 484 P.2d 1345, 1350, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1971); The Minor's Right
to Abortion, supra note 6, at 312.
20. Wadlington, supra note 4, at 125. See Bennett, supra note 2, at 311 which states that
"[aln individual's interest in a medical care decision diminishes as the medical considera-
tions dominate and provide a clear answer. On the other hand, as the decision becomes
medically or personally controversial, the individual's interest in making it for himself in-
creases."
21. Wadlington, supra note 4, at 124.
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold the Supreme Court first granted constitutional recog-
nition to the right of marital privacy by striking down a state statute which imposed an
absolute ban on the use of contraceptives. The right to privacy within the marital relationship
was found to emanate from the "penumbras" of the "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights." Id. at 484-86. Although holding that a state could not prohibit the use of contracep-
tives by married persons, the Court left open the question of whether a statute regulating the
manufacture and sale of contraceptives would be constitutional. Id. at 485.
The right to privacy does not merely extend to married persons. The Court in Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), held that "whatever the rights of the individual to access
to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married
alike." The Eisenstadt Court declared that "[ijf the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
[Vol. 12:221
SEXUAL PRIVACY
rights of adults to minors has involved an even more painstaking analysis
by the Court. The central issues confronting the Court have been: first,
what constitutional rights should be enjoyed by any person regardless of
age, and second, what differences and important interests are sufficient to
justify the restriction of these rights upon the basis of age.
The courts have not evenly resolved the degree to which minors enjoy
the rights of adults-including their privacy rights as decided by the Su-
preme Court. As one commentator noted, "[n]either the law nor society
as a whole has ever regarded children as fully the equals of their elders;
the conduct, legal rights, and social relationships of minors traditionally
are subject to regulation both by state and by their parents or legal guard-
ian." Thus the Court has refused "to conclude that minors must be ac-
corded the full panoply of constitutional rights, coextensive in kind and
degree with those accorded an adult."" However, the Court has also stated
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child" Id. (emphasis original). The Court viewed the statutory ban on distribution of
contraceptives to anyone other than a married person as a prohibition against contraceptives
per se. Id. at 443. By providing dissimilar treatment for married and single persons who were
similarly situated, the statute also violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 454-55. Contra,
Doe v. Planned Parenthood, 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75, appeal dismissed for want of
jurisdiction & cert. denied, 414 U.S. 805 (1973). Again in Eisenstadt, the Court refused to
decide whether statutes regulating the distribution of contraceptives to married or single
persons would be constitutionally permissible. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
White and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Burger where they maintain that
precautionary health measures might justify a restriction on the distribution of contracep-
tives. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 463, 466 (1972).
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal
liberty was held to protect against state action the right to privacy which included an adult
woman's qualified right to abortion. Id. at 153-54. The Court thereby pinpointed the consti-
tutional source of the privacy right which it had vaguely defined in Griswold. The Minor's
Right to Abortion, supra note 6, at 317 n. 82. This right was held to extend to the activities
of marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educa-
tion. 410 U.S. at 152-53. The companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), reiterated
the Court's holding in Roe by striking down portions of a statute which imposed procedural
conditions upon the right to obtain an abortion within the state.
Recently the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976), held that a
state could not condition abortion on the prior consent of the spouse. The Court also invalida-
ted a statute requiring parental consent before a minor could obtain an abortion during the
first twelve weeks of pregnancy. Id. at 75. Although realizing the invalidation of spousal
consent requirements might result in a unilateral decision by the wife, the Court reasoned
that, since it is the woman who is "more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy,
as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor." Id. at 71.
23. The Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 6, at 314.
24. Id. at 315.
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adults alone."25 Consequently, the Court has expanded the rights of minors
in the educational system28 and in juvenile court proceedings.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's reluctance, until recently,2 to hold
that a right of privacy is applicable to minors, lower courts" began to
recognize the privacy rights of minors shortly after Roe v. Wade." Still, a
mere recognition of a right of minors to privacy is only the first step; even
fundamental rights are not absolute and can be restricted by a compelling
state interest. Substantial and persuasive parental and state interests mili-
tate against the minor's right of privacy.
Traditionally, parents' rights to care for and control their children "have
been granted a status approaching, if not achieving, fundamentality."',
The power to direct the child's education and religious training has been
upheld against unreasonable interference by the state.2 In addition, the
reach of parental authority has been extended to the inculcation and devel-
opment of moral standards.n3 In spite of its breadth, parental dominion and
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
26. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
27. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
28. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Carey v. Population Services
Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
29. See Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973), where the court held that
a questionnaire administered by school officials to identify junior high students who had a
propensity for drug abuse was an unconstitutional invasion of a minor's right to privacy. "The
fact that the students [were] juveniles does not in any way invalidate their right to assert
their Constitutional right to privacy." Id. at 918. The right to privacy was found to be "on
an equal or possibly more elevated pedestal than some other individual constitutional rights
and should be treated with as much deference as free speech." Id. at 918. In State v. Koome,
84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975), the court held that the parental consent requirements
of an abortion statute unduly infringed upon a minor's right to privacy and denied her equal
protection of the law.
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. 1976 B.Y.U.L. REv. 296, 300.
32. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
33. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Doe v. Planned Parenthood Assoc., 29
Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75, appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction & cert. denied, 414 U.S.
805 (1973). The Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 6, at 320. The author of that article
points out that in cases where a child's constitutional rights were recognized, there was an
apparent unity of interest between parent and child. Therefore, she rejects the premise that
the Meyer - Pierce - Yoder line of cases can "be regarded as controlling when the constitu-
tional rights of a child are in conflict with those of the parent." Id. at 321.
[Vol. 12:221
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control over minors has limits; the state possesses the police power34 and
parens patriae power to override parental rights and decisions and to act
in the best interests of the child. Concomitantly, the state wields the power
to limit a minor's constitutional rights if their exercise would contravene
a defined public policy. 8
To be successful, a minor's assertion of privacy rights must overcome
both the interests of his parents and the interests of the state. Since the
common law and statutory history entrusts these parties with the authority
and responsibility for crucial decisions affecting a minor's welfare, 37 a
minor faces formidable barriers to securing the privacy rights accorded to
adults.
III. THE MINOR'S ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTIVE DEvIcES AND INFORMATION
ABSENT PARENTAL CONSENT.
State regulation in furtherance of policies against promiscuous sexual
relations among minors has not resulted in a consistent pattern of legisla-
tion. Although many states8 appear to be neutral on the issue of whether
minors are able to obtain access to contraceptives, these same states are
not neutral as to who makes the choice. Parental consent requirements
make the state appearance of neutrality illusory.
34. Police and parens patriae powers are two justifications of state authority which were
approved by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) and
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944). The state's police power has provided a
basis for the compulsory vaccination and fluoridation cases. The state can compel some of
its citizens to act in particular ways or to submit to treatment in order to protect the best
interests of all citizens. Dunn, supra note 7, at 4.
35. The parens patriae power has served to protect the child's interest in receiving neces-
sary medical care when parental consent was arbitrarily withheld. In re Sampson, 65 Misc.
2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), af'd, 37 App. Div. 2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd,
29 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972) (per curiam). In addition this power can be used when
a minor, who has been separated from the custody of his parents or whose parents' wherea-
bouts are unknown, requires consent to obtain necessary medical or surgical treatment. For
the Virginia legislature's approach, see VA. CODE ANN. § 32-137(1)-(6), (8)(Cum. Supp. 1977).
36. Various public policy interests include limiting child labor, Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944), and upholding parental authority or shielding the child from exposure
to morally questionable material, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); The Minor's
Right to Abortion, supra note 6, at 326.
37. The Minor's Right to Abortion, supra note 6, at 319-31.
38. Virginia is one of a minority of states which allows physicians to provide birth control
services to minors without parental consent. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-137(7)(Cum. Supp. 1977).
While this statutory section allows a minor to give effective consent to medical or health
services required in the case of pregnancy, it explicitly excludes abortion and surgical sterili-
zation procedures from this category.
39. The Contraceptive Controversy, supra note 14, at 1013.
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Divergent judicial opinions concerning access to contraceptives have
arisen in the lower courts. In denying minors the right of access to contra-
ceptives without parental consent, the Utah Supreme Court 0 reasoned
that such access would deprive parents of the right to teach and instill
morality in their children.4' In addition, the absence of a parental consent
requirement would increase the likelihood that a child of immature judg-
ment would break the law prohibiting fornication and would contract ve-
nereal disease." The Utah Court did not address the issue of a minor's right
to privacy."
In contrast to the Utah Court's approach, a three-judge panel in T_
H_ v. Jones,44 stated that because no "developmental differences" exist
40. Doe v. Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Utah, 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75, appeal
dismissed for want of jurisdiction & cert. denied, 414 U.S. 805 (1973). A sixteen-year-old
single girl brought a class action suit seeking injunctive relief against Planned Parenthood to
make contraceptive services available to minors without notifying their parents or obtaining
parental consent. She alleged that these prerequisites constituted deprivation of the class of
minor's rights to privacy and equal protection of the laws. The trial court granted the injunc-
tion, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed in a terse opinion.
41. The Utah Supreme Court's majority felt that the lower court's decision ignored"entirely the question of the morals of children and of the duty of parents to teach and
instruct them and to watch over them so as to promote morality, health, and happiness."
Doe v. Planned Parenthood Assoc., 29 Utah 356, 510 P.2d 75, 76, appeal dismissed for want
of jurisdiction & cert. denied,414 U.S. 805 (1973); see The Minor's Right to Abortion, supra
note 6.
42. Doe v. Planned Parenthood Assoc., 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75, 76, appeal dismissed
for want of jurisdiction & cert. denied, 414 U.S. 805 (1973). This conclusion is based on the
questionable assumption that fear of pregnancy deters teenage sex. Comment, 1974 UTAH L.
REv. 433, 439.
43. The court summarily dispensed with the equal protection argument by stating that the
fornication statute "has never been considered to deny the equal protection of the law to
single people who may want to satisfy their lusts on each other." 510 P.2d at 77. Refusing
contraceptive services to minors absent parental consent was not a denial of equal protection,
as the court held that single minors are not in the same class as married people. Id. The court
assumed that because minors are different from adults, then access to contraceptives should
be restricted. However, the court accomplished this without elaborating on the connection
between those conceded differences and the object of the law.
See The Contraceptive Controversy, supra note 14, at 1012 n.73. Although the Harvard Law
Review commentator felt that the Utah court used faulty equal protection analysis, that
contention is incorrect. The court implicitly, though not explicitly, decided that the right of
access by minors to contraceptives was not fundamental; it therefore applied the rational
relationship standard of review. This approach is consistent with good equal protection analy-
sis. The commentator's finding of "fault" in the opinion appears to be the court's failure to
hold this right as fundamental, rather than the equal protection analysis itself.
44. Civil No. C74-276 (D. Utah, July 23, 1975). The Jones case is an unreported decision
which is discussed in Case Notes, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REv. 296. Since a copy of the decision
was unavailable, any criticism of the case is based upon this article. In Jones, a three-judge
federal court struck down the state's attempt, through the administration of federally funded
[Vol. 12:221
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between adults and minors,45 the right of access to contraceptives could not
be restricted by the requirement of parental consent." Relying on the Roe'7
decision, the court reasoned that since the fourteenth amendment protects
a woman's right to abortion, it must also protect her right to take precau-
tions against pregnancy." While recognizing that parental rights are"entitled to considerable legal deference,"" the court required that they
be subordinated to valid state interests. At the same time, a state's interest
in enforcing parental decisions may be inferior to the "fundamental right
of minors" to free access to contraceptives, information and devices.
These conflicting approaches have in part been resolved by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Carey v. Population Services International.5
The Court held that "a blanket prohibition of the distribution of [non-
prescriptive] contraceptives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed"5 by the
Court's prior decision in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth." Of "particular
family planning services, to impose parental consent requirements on the availability of
contraceptive services to minors. Since the state thereby "engrafted a condition of eligibility
not required by the governing federal statutes and regulations," id. at 308, the court held that
clause conflicted with the supremacy clause andwas therefore void. Id. at 297.
45. Id. at 309; see State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
46. Case Notes, supra note 44, at 297.
47. 410 U.S. 119 (1973).
48. Case Notes, supra note 44, at 309.
49. Id. at 309-10.
50. Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Jones case and
affirmed the lower court's decision that the parental consent requirements were void. The
Court did not decide the constitutional issue; it merely affirmed the judgment on the grounds
that the parental consent regulation of the state was inconsistent with the Social Security
Act, 96 S. Ct. 2195 (1976). A reasonable explanation for the Court's action in Jones is provided
by the jurisdictional mandates of 28 U.S.C. § 1253. This statute provides for a direct appeal
from a three-judge federal court to the Supreme Court. While jurisdiction pursuant to § 1253
is mandatory, the Court summarily disposes of many federal court judgments by affirmance.
P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONsTrrurioNA DECISIONMAKINo: CASES AND MATERIALS 80 (1975).
51. 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977). The Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge district court's deci-
sion in Population Services Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) that had held
unconstitutional, under the first and fourteenth amendments, a New York law which made
it a crime for any person to sell or distribute nonprescription contraceptives to a minor under
the age of sixteen. The law also made it a crime for anyone other than a licensed pharmacist
to distribute contraceptives to persons over sixteen and for anyone, including licensed phar-
macists, to advertise or display contraceptives. The decision of the district court holding
unconstitutional these portions was affirmed by the Supreme Court; however, these specific
aspects of the case are beyond the scope of this article.
52. 97 S. Ct. at 2021.
53. The Court stated that Danforth prevents the state from imposing "a blanket prohibi-
tion or even a blanket requirement of parental consent on the choice of a minor to terminate
her pregnancy. ... Id. at 2021. Such state interests as protection of the health of the
mother or of potential life, are more implicated in the abortion decision and thus are less
supportive of regulations restricting the decision to use non-hazardous contraceptives. Id.
1977]
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significance" to the Court's decision in Carey was their reasoning that the"right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends
to minors as well as to adults." 4 The Court reiterated the holdings of
previous decisions recognizing the constitutional rights of minors and con-
cluded that "state restrictions inhibiting privacy rights of minors are valid
only if they serve any significant state interest ... that is not present in
the case of an adult. 55
The state argued that the free availability of contraceptives to minors,
would lead to increased sexual activity among the young, in contravention
of the state's policy to discourage such behavior.-5 This reasoning was
found insufficient to support a total ban on distribution of nonprescriptive
contraceptives to minors. The argument that minors' sexual activity may
be deterred by increasing the attendant hazards was not taken seriously
by the Court. 51 Moreover, there was no evidence that promiscuity was
substantially related to the availability of contraceptives. 8
It is now clear that any state regulation which imposes a blanket restric-
tion upon a minor's decision to procreate must be in furtherance of a
significant state interest and must be a reasonable means of pursuing that
interest. But the opinion is limited in its impact for several reasons.
First, the Court is not willing to extend this type of careful scrutiny to a
state regulation whenever it implicates sexual freedom; "only when it
54. Id.
55. Id. (emphasis added). The Court's opinion reflects the use of a standard of review
intermediate between minimum rationality and the compelling state interest test, which is
closely akin to "minimum rationality with bite." The Court required more than a rational
relationship between the statute and the state's interest; it required a significant state inter-
est to justify the restriction on matters affecting childbearing in minors. Despite the Court's
apparent recognition that privacy rights of minors approach fundamental status, the Court
implied that burdens placed upon these rights might be justified if they are based upon
supporting evidence and are "more than a bare assertion .... " Id. at 2022. The majority
opinion is unclear as to the exact level of review in cases where state laws restrict minors in
sexual matters. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion believes (and perhaps accurately)
that "the relevant question in any case where state laws impinge on the freedom of action of
young people in sexual matters is whether the restriction rationally serves valid state inter-
ests." Id. at 2028.
56. Id. at 2020. Judicial notice was taken of the fact that sexual activity among minors is
high with or without access to contraceptives and that the consequences of such activity are
frequently devastating. Id. at 2022.
57. Id. at 2021. The Court's reasoning was taken from Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), "[it would be plainly unreasonable to assume that (the state) has prescribed preg-
nancy and the birth of an unwanted child (or the physical and psychological dangers of an
abortion) as punishment for fornication." 97 S. Ct. at 2022. No such "scheme of values" was
attributed to the state by the Court. Id.
58. 97 S. Ct. at 2021-22.
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burden[s] an individual's right to decide to prevent contraception or ter-
minate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of effec-
tuating that decision"5 will greater scrutiny be required. The Court held
that while there is no "independent fundamental 'right of access to contra-
ceptives,'" access is an essential element of the constitutionally protected
right of being free from unjustified intrusion by the state in decisions
involving matters of childbearing. 0
Second, the Court did not specifically address whether or not a state
might require parental consent or parental consultation as a prerequisite
to access to nonprescriptive contraceptives. It is unclear if such a require-
ment would be a "substantial limitation" upon a minor's "decision to bear
or beget a child." Justice Powell in a concurring opinion, points out that
"there [may] be considerably more room for state regulation in this area
than would be permissible under the Court's opinion."6' Powell believes
that a state might constitutionally require a minor to seek "parental guid-
ance" before engaging in sexual intercourse" (and impliedly before obtain-
ing contraceptives). Powell reasoned that the Court's prior invalidation of
the requirement of parental consent as a prerequisite to a minor obtaining
an abortion 3 would not necessarily require an invalidation of such a re-
quirement as a prerequisite to minors engaging in sexual intercourse." In
the abortion decision, the minor was necessarily required to consult with
a physician, and thus parental consultation and consent was unnecessary.
But because minors do not necessarily consult with anyone prior to their
decision to engage in sexual relations, the requirement of parental consult-
ation might be constitutionally permissible.
Finally, the Supreme Court was not faced with a minor's access to pre-
59. Id. at 2018, n. 5.
60. Id. at 2018. The majority emphasized that the underlying holding in Griswold,
Eisenstadt and Roe was that the right of personal privacy includes the protected right of
independence in the "decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 2018. "The decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally
protected choices." Id. at 2016.
61. Id. at 2029.
62. Id. Powell considers a requirement that minors seek parental guidance would be consis-
tent with the Court's prior cases. Powell states that Danforth "explicitly suggested that a
materially different constitutional issue would be presented with respect to a statute assuring
in most instances consultation between the parent and child." Id. Great importance is placed
upon the relationship of parent and child by Powell; he states that the law was invalid
because it "prohibits parents from distributing contraceptives to their children, a restriction
that unjustifiably interferes with parental interests in rearing their children." Id. at 2028. The
statute would allow the state to punish the exercise of parental responsibility. Id. at 2029.
63. The Court so held in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
64. 97 S. Ct. at 2029.
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scriptive contraceptive devices.65 Quite possibly, some states may attempt
to place restrictions upon a minor's access to prescriptive contraceptives.
It would appear, however, that parental consent requirements would be
impermissible; like the decision to have an abortion, the decision to pro-
cure a prescriptive contraceptive necessarily requires consultation with a
physician, and parental consent and consultation would be unnecessary.
IV. THE MINOR'S AccEsS TO ABORTION ABSENT PARENTAL CONSENT.
A. The Adult's Right to Abortion.
Judicial recognition 6 of a woman's prerogative to decide whether or not
to bear a child culminated in the Roe v. Wade 7 and Doe v. Bolton"5 deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, which greatly increased the availability" of
65. It should be noted "[tihat the constitutionally protected right of privacy extends to
an individual's liberty to make choices regarding contraception does not, however, automati-
cally invalidate every state regulation in this area. The business of manufacturing and selling
contraceptives may be regulated in ways that do not infringe protected individual choices."
Id. at 2017.
66. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 915 (1970). In Belous the court stated that
the fundamental right of the women to choose whether to bear children follows from
the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledgment of a 'right of privacy
or liberty' in matters related to marriage, family, and sex. . . .That such a right is
not enumerated in either the United States or California Constitutions is no impedi-
ment to the existence of the right.
458 P.2d at 199-200 (citations omitted).
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 920-21 (1973), for a concise outline of the Supreme Court's decision.
68. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Doe case reiterates Roe in holding that the abortion decision
rests with the pregnant woman and her physician and also "extends Roe by warning that just
as states may not prevent abortions by making their performance a crime, they may not make
abortions unreasonably difficult to obtain by prescribing elaborate procedural barriers."
Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 237, 240 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Implications of the Abortion Decisions],
see Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974) and Doe v. Hale Hosp., 500 F.2d
144 (1st Cir. 1974), where the courts held that municipal hospitals could not refuse to make
its facilities available for abortions. See also Hathaway v. Worchester City Hospital, 475 F.2d
701 (1st Cir. 1973), where the court held that a hospital could not refuse to allow voluntary
sterilization operations when it allowed other comparable surgical procedures with similar
medical risks.
69. Abortions were formerly statutorily restricted in a majority of states to circumstances
where the abortion was necessary to save the life of the mother. George, The Evolving Law
of Abortion, 23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 708, 716-17 nn.46 & 47 (1972). The severity of this
requirement was lessened as legislatures (Id. at 740 and n. 173) and courts (People v. Belous,
71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); In re
P.J., 12 CraM. L. REP. 2549 (1973)) recognized the grave physical and psychological harm to
a woman's health that might result from an unwanted childbirth.
[Vol. 12:221
SEXUAL PRIVACY
abortion to adult women. The Supreme Court in Roe7 ° held that a Texas
abortion statute unconstitutionally restricted a woman's right of privacy
in the abortion decision. Although the right of privacy7 was by no means
a new concept, the exact basis of this right eluded the Court." Whatever
the basis, the justices concluded that the right to privacy was "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. ' 7-
Despite implicitly holding that this right was fundamental, 74 the Court
made it clear that it was not an absolute right, but rather a qualified right
which could be limited during the later stages of pregnancy by compelling
state interests.75 Applying the compelling state interest test to the statutes
in Roe and Doe, the Court found the state's interests in maternal health
and in potential life of the fetus to be insufficient to override the right of a
woman and her physician to decide to terminate a pregnancy during the
first trimester.7"
B. The Minor's Right to Abortion.
The Court in those cases declined to decide77 whether a state could
constitutionally deny abortions to minors in the absence of parental con-
sent.7 8 Nonetheless, some lower courts (through statutory interpretation) 7
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. The right of privacy has been characterized as the "right to be let alone" and has been
recognized as the "most comprehensive rights and the right most valued by civilized man."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Union
Pacific Railroad v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
72. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) for the differing Justices' views on
the basis of the right to privacy.
73. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
74. The Court looked to "the need for the right and the dire consequences of its denial."
Note, 24 KAN. L. REv. 446, 449 (1976), quoting Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir.
1975).
75. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
76. Id. at 163-64. The pregnant woman's privacy right merely allows her to decide whether
to seek an abortion; "the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, must bear
the primary responsibility for the ultimate decision and its effectuation, and must decide in
his medical judgment the patient's pregnancy should be terminated." The Minor's Right to
Abortion, supra note 6, at 314.
77. One commentator concluded that Roe and Doe left unanswered as many questions as
they settled. Critical issues which remain to be resolved and which are beyond the scope of
this article are discussed in depth in Implications of the Abortion Decisions, supra note 68.
78. 410 U.S. 113, 165 n. 67 (1973).
79. Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971). In Ballard
the court held that a California statute allowing a minor to consent to medical care "related
to pregnancy" included the right of a minor to obtain an abortion absent parental consent.
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have allowed minors to independently obtain abortions, and other lower
courts have held parental consent requirements to be unconstitutional. 0
In these cases, demanding parental consent before a minor can obtain
an abortion has been held to exacerbate several problems: first, the danger
that the operation will be delayed and thereby be made more hazardous;
second, the risk that a minor will resort to the techniques of an unlicensed
abortionist or self-abortion; third, the damaging consequences that an
unwanted child has on the minor and society, as well as the child; and
fourth, the potential conflict which the abortion decision creates between
the minor and her parents.8 '
An analysis of several state interests typically advanced to counter the
minor's claims was made in Poe v. Gerstein.82 The court followed the Roe
approach3 in analyzing "the need for the right and dire consequences of
its denial"" and found no differences between minors and adults that
would justify a denial of this right to minors. After establishing the minor's
tentative right to an abortion, the court examined the interests asserted
by the state to determine whether they were sufficiently compelling to
override the minor's asserted rights.
See also In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972), where the court interpreted a
statute similar to the one in Ballard; the Smith court held that the statute prevented a
mother from compelling her daughter to have an abortion against the daughter's wishes.
The Virginia statute specifically excludes abortion from the medical matters in which
minors are competent to give consent. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-137(7)(Cum. Supp. 1977).
80. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534
(M.D. Pa. 1975); Planned Parenthood v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Foe
v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D.
Ky. 1974); State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975). Contra, Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
81. Pilpel and Zuckerman, Abortion and the Rights of Minors, 23 CASE W. REs. L. Rv.
779, 780 (1972).
82. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd sub nom., Gerstein v. Coe, 96 S. Ct. 3202 (1976).
The Poe court held that the fundamental right to abortion applies to minors as well as adults.
The state interests advanced to counter the minor's claims were: first, the prevention of illicit
sex among minors; second, the protection of minors from their own improvidence; third, the
fostering of parental control; and fourth, support for the family as a social unit. Note 24 KAN.
L. REv. 446, 450 (1976). Since these interests are not merely related to maternal health or
potential life, but rather to legitimate concerns not considered in Roe v. Wade, that case may
not be controlling; "it is possible that a state's interest in limiting a minor's right to an
abortion would be compelling at any stage of pregnancy." Id.
83. 517 F.2d at 790. The Poe court rejected the alternative approaches used by other courts
in analyzing the scope of minors' rights, either: "(1) all fundamental rights apply to minors,
but the state may sometimes assert an interest sufficient to justify the state action; or (2)
minors do not necessarily have all the fundamental rights of adults." Id.
84. Id. at 791.
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The Poe court found that the parental consent statute was not necessary
to deter illicit sex among minors since the state could enact legislation
which directly provided criminal sanctions for illicit sexual conduct., The
interest in protecting minors from their own improvidence was found to be
a legitimate goal, but the Poe court held that the statute was not drawn
with sufficient precision to effect only the state interests at stake.,, The
court acknowledged that fostering "parental control",87 which is important
to the stability of society, is a justifiable state interest, but stated that this
interest was not compelling; the pregnant minor's having sought an abor-
tion contrary to her parents' wishes indicated that "whatever control the
parent once had over the minor had diminished, if not evaporated en-
tirely."" The final interest asserted by the state, maintaining the family
as a social unit, was held not sufficiently compelling, as pregnancy might
have already "fractured" the family structure, and the parental consent
85. Id. at 792. Further, the court questioned whether deterring illicit sex was the statute's
purpose, since the goal of deterring sexual conduct of minors was undermined by another
state law which allowed unmarried minors to have access to contraceptives. Id. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 32-137(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977), which allows minors access to contraceptives without
parental consent. See note 38, supra. Rather than discouraging illicit sex, therefore, the
statute encouraged the use of contraceptives and punished only those sexually active minors
who failed to use contraceptives; it exacted a "penalty" by compelling the pregnant minor
to give birth to an unwanted child, unless her parents gave consent to the abortion. Note, 24
KAN. L. lav. 446, 450-51 (1976).
86. The state's interest in improving the quality of the decision whether to have an abortion
could more narrowly be achieved by the requirement of parental "consultation" rather than
permission prior to the abortion. 517 F.2d at 793. The court clearly stated at note 11 that it
was not intimating that such an example of a a statute would necessarily pass constitutional
muster. Moreover, the Poe court questioned the necessity of a third person's opinion in the
decision, since the physician is prepared to counsel the minor about the physical and mental
consequences of the abortion. Id. "Even if a third opinion is deemed desirable, a requirement
of psychological counselling before the abortion is a better alternative than requiring parental
consent. In this way, the quality of the decision could be improved by the addition of a neutral
party to the decisionmaking process. Note, 24 Kan. L. Rev. 446, 457 n.35 (1976).
Other courts have recognized that the requirement of parental consent for a minor's abor-
tion provides parents with a "veto power" which might be exercised for the purpose of
punishment or for no reason at all. Wolf v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974);
State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
87. 517 F.2d at 793. The Poe court defined parental control as "the continuing ability of
the parent to direct the maturing minor's decisions."
88. Id. at 793-94. The state's enforcement of a parental decision at a time when the minor
was probably near legal majority was not deemed likely to restore parental control. Id.
Contra, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1370-71 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The district court referred to the state's interest in"safeguarding the authority of the family relationship" and held that Roe and Doe did not
intend to preclude the consideration of fundamental state interest other than protection of
maternal health and fetal life. Id. at 1370-71. The court required only a rational relationship
between the state interest and the statute. Note, 24 KAN. L. Rav. 446, 454 (1976).
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requirement "cannot reasonably be expected to restore the family's viabil-
ity as a unit."9
Despite the Supreme Court's former reluctance to decide the issue, in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth9" it held that the parental consent re-
quirements of a Missouri abortion statute" were unconstitutional. The
Court first acknowledged that minors have a right to privacy. While recog-
nizing that the state has broader authority to regulate the activities of
minors than of adults,9 2 the Court reiterated its position that minors "are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. '9 3 The
Court then addressed the question of "whether there is any significant
state interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent or
person in loco parentis that is not present in the case of an adult." 4
89. 517 F.2d at 794.
90. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Supreme Court reversed a three-judge federal district court,
392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975), which upheld the validity of a Missouri statute. The
statute required an unmarried minor to obtain the consent of a parent or person in loco
parentis to an abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy; this consent was required
unless the abortion was certified by a licensed physician to be necessary to preserve the life
of the mother. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.1 and § 18.2-76 (Repl. Vol. 1975). The Virginia
statute allows for an abortion (during all three trimesters of pregnancy) on any woman if it
is necessary, in the opinion of the physician, to save her life. The statute is unclear as to
whether the parental consent requirements of section 18.2-76 apply to this situation. "The
state's interest in safeguarding the authority in the family relationship" was viewed by the
district court as a "compelling basis for allowing regulation of a minor's freedom to consent
to an abortion." 392 F. Supp. at 1370. Because the "state has a duty to support parents in
the discharge of their responsibility for the care of their children," the parents are entitled to
the support of laws designed to achieve that goal. Id.
The district court believed that minors were incapable of giving legal consent and that the
Roe decision was not intended to emancipate children in that respect. 392 F. Supp. at 1371.
Roe and Doe did not preclude the consideration of fundamental state interests other than
protection of maternal health and fetal life. The parental consent requirement of the abortion
law was "justified by such other compelling interests." Id.
91. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (Repl. Vol. 1975). The Virginia statute requires parental
consent for a minor's abortion during all three trimesters of pregnancy. As the Missouri
statute's parental consent requirement for a minor's abortion during the first trimester of
pregnancy was invalidated, it is clear that section 18.2-76 is unconstitutional at least as to
the requirement of parental consent during the first trimester.
92. 428 U.S. 52, 72 (1976); see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). See also
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
93. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); see, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969). Constitutional rights "do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority." 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). The dissenting judge
in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1376 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (Webster, J.,
dissenting), had difficulty in discerning why a minor, sufficiently mature to comprehend the
abortion procedure and to make an intelligent decision with the advice of her doctor, would
not be entitled to the same right of self-determination that is accorded to adult women.
94. Id. at 75.
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As in Poe v. Gerstein,95 the state advanced the interest in safeguarding
the family unit and the interest of parental control. The Court in Danforth
found it difficult to conclude that the family unit would be strengthened
by providing a parent with the power to overrule a decision by a minor
patient and her doctor to terminate the pregnancy. Such veto power would
not be likely to "enhance parental authority or control where the minor
and nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very
existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure.""6
The Court held that the state possesses no authority to delegate to a third
person a veto power which the state is prohibited from exercising during
the first trimester of pregnancy. 7 Any independent interest which a parent
had in the abortion decision was "no more weighty than the right of pri-
vacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant. 9 8
In striking down the blanket consent provision of the Missouri statute,
the Court emphasized that this "does not suggest that every minor, regard-
less of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy." 9 The constitutional infirmity of the statute was the imposi-
tion of a special consent provision, exercisable by one other than the minor
and her physician, as a prerequisite to the minor's abortion.99 The statute
did so without sufficient justifications for the restriction and thus violated
the strictures of Roe and Doe.'
95. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
96. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
97. Id. at 69. The Court agreed with the dissenting judge's language in the lower court
decision regarding spousal consent requirements. See 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975)
for the lower court opinion. Much of what was said by the Supreme Court regarding the
statute's spousal consent requirements applied with equal force to the statute's parental
consent requirements. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
98. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). It appears that the Court is confusing and equating physiological
maturity with psychological maturity. State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975);
Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
99. 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
100. Id. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, in which Justice Powell joined, stated that
the Court's opinion in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), suggests that
a materially different constitutional issue would be presented under a provision requir-
ing parental consent or consultation in most cases but providing for prompt (i) judicial
resolution of any disagreement between the parent and the minor, or (ii) judicial
determination that the minor is mature enough to give an informed consent without
parental concurrence or that abortion in any event is in the minor's best interest. Such
a provision would not impose parental approval as an absolute condition upon the
minor's right but would assure in most instances consultation between the parent and
child.
Id. at 90-91.
101. Id. Four justices strongly dissented on the issue of parental consent. Justices White,
Burger and Rehnquist maintained that the purpose of the requirement was not merely to
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At first blush the high Court appears to have finally settled the contro-
versial issue in which lower courts have been embattled since Roe and Doe,
i.e., whether a minor has a constitutional right to abortion which cannot
be restricted by the requirements of parental consent. A closer reading of
the Danforth decision demonstrates otherwise. The invalidated Missouri
statute required parental consent to a minor's abortion during the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy. The validity of these requirements during the
later stage of pregnancy was not an issue before the Court, and thus their
constitutional status is uncertain."2 Since the state's interest in maternal
health and fetal life increases after the first trimester, the Court could
analogize a concomitant increase in parental interests according to the
three stages enumerated in Roe. 03 At the very least the Danforth decision
on the availability of abortions to minors indicates that "whatever basis
there may be for a general requirement of parental consent for [other]
medical treatment of minors, the requirement is not appropriate in the
abortion context."''0 4
V. THE MINOR'S ACCESS TO STERILIZATION OPERATIONS ABSENT PARENTAL
CONSENT.
Over thirty years ago the Supreme Court declared that procreation is a
vindicate any parental or state interest but to also "vindicate the very right created in Roe
v. Wade-the right of the pregnant woman to decide whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy." Id. at 94-95 (emphasis original). The dissenters felt that the state was entitled to
protect the minor from making the decision to undergo an abortion, a decision which might
not be in her best interests. The requirement of parental consent was deemed by the dissen-
ters to be a traditional and valid method of achieving the state's goal. Id. at 95.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent on this issue. To his mind the state's interest in
the welfare of its youth is sufficient to support the parental consent requirement. The overrid-
ing consideration, according to Stevens, is that the abortion decision be exercised as wisely
as possible, and a legislative determination that this decision will be made more wisely with
parental advice "is surely not irrational." Id. at 103.
102. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76 (Repl. Vol. 1975). As the Virginia statute requires paren-
tal consent to a minor's abortion during all three trimesters, this requirement during the first
trimester is clearly open to constitutional attack. The Virginia Legislature will probably
delete the presumably invalid portion of section 18.2-76 through the use of the severability
clause in section 18.2-76.2 (Repl. Vol. 1975). The validity of the remaining portion requiring
parental consent during the second and third trimesters will remain effective and unresolved
unless it is challenged.
103. The Court's caveat-that not every minor regardless of age or maturity may give
effective consent to abortion-may reduce the Danforth decision to a consitutional recogni-
tion of a mature minor rule as applied to abortion. However, the importance of the Court's
action in striking down parental consent requirements for abortion during the first trimester
of pregnancy cannot be overestimated.
104. Note, 24 KAN. L. Rzv. 446, 457 (1976).
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fundamental constitutional right.' 5 Recent court decisions' 0 on contracep-
tion and abortion may mean that, conversely, the right not to procreate
may be similarly fundamental. Even so, the judiciary and legislatures have
been less inclined to accept voluntary sterilization 7 than either contracep-
tion or abortion.
Although allowing sterilization does not violate defined public policy,'10
only a small minority of states'0 have enacted legislation which permits
such operations. The absence of statutory standards has sanctioned the
imposing of restrictions on voluntary sterilization"' by powerful public and
private organizations."' In essence, the existence of a constitutional protec-
tion for access to sterilization procedures is determined by whether the
medical facility is either public or private."' The response of physicians
and hospitals includes limiting sterilization to married persons and refus-
ing to perform sterilizations at all."'
105. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
106. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
107. Voluntary contraceptive sterilization refers to a sterilization operation which is per-
formed as a method of birth control upon a patient who knowingly and willingly requests this
treatment. It must be contrasted with eugenic sterilization which is performed on the men-
tally retarded in order to control the passing on of certain genetic traits. Eugenic sterilization
and the controversy surrounding forced sterilization is beyond the scope of this article.
108. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
109. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-423 to -427 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
110. Comment, A Constitutional Evaluation of Statutory and Administrative Impedi-
ments to Voluntary Sterilization, 14 J. FAM. L. 67, 68-69 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Impe-
diments to Voluntary Sterilization].
111. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Joint Commission on Accredi-
tation of Hospitals and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have exten-
sively regulated sterilization operations. Id. at 70-71.
112. Public and private medical facilities are not bound by the same standards. Private
medical facilities may determine their own policies and the circumstances under which they
will perform or refuse to perform sterilizations. Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F.
Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973); Allen v. Sisters of Saint Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex.
1973). Public facilities may not. A medical facility was held to be public when it appeared
that at least some of its staff members were paid from public funds and that the hospital
was owned by the community and supported by public funds. McCabe v. Nassau County
Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971).
Categorizing an institution as public or private may not be so easy. "The exact extent of
governmental funding and control necessary to make a hospital's conduct 'state action' for
judicial review purposes" is unclear. Impediments to Voluntary Sterilization, supra note 110,
at 82. Therefore, the availability of sterilizations in a purportedly private medical facility
which prohibits their performance must be litigated through the courts.
113. Impediments to Voluntary Sterilization, supra note 110, at 71-72. In Hathaway v.
Worchester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973), the First Circuit Court of Appeals
confronted the issue of a public hospital's restriction on sterilization and reversed the lower
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A. Spousal Consent Requirements for Sterilization Operations
Where the performance of sterilization operations is regulated, but not
prohibited, the constitutional ramifications become more complex. Some
hospital regulations base the availability of sterilization on the age of the
woman and the number of her living children."' Other regulations call for
the patient, if married, to obtain the consent of his or her spouse."'
The constitutionality of spousal consent requirements has been consid-
ered by several lower courts," 6 which have found them to be invalid. In
court. The lower court held that a married woman had no constitutional right to a steriliza-
tion operation performed in a city hospital where there was no state statute compelling the
hospital to allow performance of the operation and where sterilization was of doubtful legality
in the state. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Mass. 1972).
A complete ban on voluntary sterilization within the hospital was held unconstitutional by
the Court of Appeals. Since the hospital performed other surgery involving greater medical
risk to a patient and greater demand on hospital facilities, the ban was deemed to violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 475 F.2d at 706. The "decision to
terminate the possibility of any future pregnancy" was found "to embrace all of the factors
deemed important by the [Supreme] Court in Roe in finding a fundamental interest .. "
Id. at 705. The state interests recognized in Roe were held to be far less compelling against
sterilization than they were against abortions. After the state had undertaken to provide
general short-term hospital care, the Hathaway court held that the state could not"constitutionally draw the line at medically indistinguishable surgical procedures that im-
pinge on fundamental rights." Id. at 706.
114. The "age-parity formula," as this criterion is termed, involves a multiplication of the
woman's age by the number of her living children. Only when the multiplication product
equalled 120 could a woman be sterilized. Comment, Contraceptive Sterilization: The Need
for Regulation, 6 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 79, 82 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Need for
Regulation]. In McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1971), the
age-parity formula was attacked as an arbitrary classification which denied equal protection
and which invaded the right to privacy in the marital relationship. One commentator suggests
that the age-parity formula can be attacked as a violation of due process as "the formula sets
up an irrebtittable presumption as to the individual's qualification for sterilization."
Impediments to Voluntary Sterilization, supra note 110, at 80-81. A hearing (before the
sterilization operation was denied) based on the medical factors unique to an individual's case
was suggested as a means of complying with due process standards. Id. at 81.
115. The established policy of the Virginia Commonwealth University Medical College of
Virginia (MCV) in Richmond, Virginia, is to deny all requests for sterilization unless it is
accompanied by the written consent of the spouse. Doe v. Temple, 409 F. Eupp. 899, 903 (E.D.
Va. 1976). Through spousal consent requirements physicians "seek to protect themselves
against potential civil liability which might arise at the behest of the nonconsenting spouse."
Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574, 575 (1975).
116. Id.; Murray v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); Doe v. North Ottawa
Community Hosp. Authority, Civ. No. 2706 (Ottawa, Mich. Cir. Ct., May 15, 1973), cited in
Impediments to Voluntary Sterilization, supra note 110, at 79 n. 68.
In Murray the Oklahoma court found that the right of a competent person to control his
or her body was paramount to the desires of the spouse. In the court's view, a married
woman's right to her health could not be qualified by the requirement of spousal consent.
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contrast, the court in Doe v. Temple, "17 avoided reaching the constitution-
ality of the Virginia statute"' which was alleged to require spousal consent.
The Temple court reasoned that the statutes merely provided a means by
which doctors who perform sterilization operations could gain immunity
from possible civil and criminal liability,"' and hence the statutes did not
522 P.2d at 304. In Ponter, the New Jersey court concluded that the right to sterilization
without spousal consent was a "natural and logical corollary" to a woman's right to procure
an abortion or other operation wihout her husband's consent. 342 A.2d at 578.
117. Civ. No. 76-006-R (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 1976). A married woman who had been separated
from her husband for less than a year challenged Virginia's sterilization statute which both
she and the defendant, Medical College of Virginia (MCV), believed to prohibit sterilizaton
of married persons without spousal consent. The defendants' assumption of the necessity of
spousal consent coupled with their fear of civil and criminal liability resulted in an estab-
lished policy of denying all requests for sterilization unless accompanied by the written
consent of the spouse. When the MCV physician refused to perform the sterilization without
the husband's consent, the plaintiff filed suit alleging a deprivation of the right of privacy
on matters of procreation under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments.
Through statutory interpretation of the two Virginia sterilization statutes at issue, the
three-judge federal court found "that together they grant civil and criminal immunity to
doctors who perform sterilizations when all conditions of the statute are met." Id. at 3.
Although a statutory grant of immunity under certain conditions might encourage a physician
to comply with those conditions before performing a sterilization, the Temple court held that
the statute did not prohibit the operation when those conditions were not met. Id. at 4. As
the court was of the opinion that sterilization without spousal consent was not prohibited by
law there was no infringement of the plaintiff's right to privacy. Id. at 5.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-423 (Cum. Supp. 1976) provided:
It shall be lawful for any physician or surgeon licensed by this State, when so
requested by any person who has attained the age of twenty-one years, to perform,
upon such person a vasectomy, or salpingectomy, or other surgical sexual sterilization
procedure, as the case may be, provided a request in writing is made by such person
and by his spouse, if there be one, prior to the performance of such surgical operation
and provided further, that prior to or at the time of such request a full and reasonable
medical explanation is given by such physician or surgeon to such person as to the
meaning and consequences of such operation. No such request shall be necessary for
the spouse of the person requesting such surgical operation if the person requesting
such operation shall, at the time of the request, state in writing under oath that they
have lived separate and apart without any cohabitation and without interruption for
a period of one year or more immediately prior to such sworn statement and request
or if the person requesting such operation exhibits an executed separation agreement
signed by both spouses or a certified copy of a decree of divorce from bed and board.
Provided, however, that no such surgical operation shall be performed pursuant to the
provisions of this section prior to thirty days from the date of consent or request
therefor on any person who has not theretofore become the parent of a child.
This statute has been amended. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32-423 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-426 (Repl. Vol. 1973), provided:
Subject to the rules of law applicable generally to negligence, no physician or surgeon
licensed by this State shall be liable either civilly or criminally by reason of having
performed a vasectomy, salpingectomy, or other surgical sexual sterilization procedure
authorized by the provisions of this chapter upon any person in this State.
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actually prohibit sterilization when spousal consent was absent.
The Temple court's statutory interpretation is tenuous. The defendant
hospital's regulation prohibited sterilization without spousal consent; the
effect is the same whether prohibited by the state or the hospital. In view
of the public character of the defendant, a challenge to the hospital's
regulation requiring spousal consent prior to sterilization should succeed.
If the Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 0 concerning
spousal consent requirements for abortion is logically extended, consent
requirements for sterilization may also be unconstitutional.
B. Parental Consent Requirements for Sterilization Operations
As a practical matter, not many minors desire to end their reproductive
capacity. However, for those minors who do, sterilization operations are
severely circumscribed.12" ' Because it is irreversible, a sterilization is not
likely to be peformed with the minor's consent alone. 2  Litigation on steri-
120. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
121. The few states which have enacted legislation permitting such operations impose
much more restrictive barriers on a minor than an adult seeking sterilization. See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 32-424 (Cum. Supp. 1976), which provides:
Any such physician or surgeon may perform a vasectomy, salpingectomy, or other
surgical sexual sterilization procedure upon any person under the age of twenty-one
years, provided that the circuit court of the county or city wherein such minor resides,
upon petition of the parent or parents, if they be living, or the committee, guardian,
or next friend of such minor, shall determine that the operation is in the best interest
of such minor and society; and further that said minor is afflicted with any hereditary
form of mental illness that is recurrent, or with mental retardation, or that the health
of such minor would be endangered by a pregnancy, and shall enter an order authoriz-
ing the physician or surgeon to perform such operation as such order has become final.
In any such proceeding, the minor shall be made a party defendant and served with
process, a discreet and competent attorney-at-law shall be appointed as guardian ad
litem for such minor to faithfully represent and protect its interest, and to otherwise
comply with the provisions of § 8-88 of the Code of Virginia. The judge of the court in
which the petition is filed may, at his discretion, waive all fees and court costs in
connection with such court proceeding.
122. Even though at least one state supreme court decision, Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d
16, 431 P.2d 719 (1967), has held that a minor may give effective consent to a vasectomy, the
decision was based on the "emancipated minor" exception to the requirement of parental
consent. The minor in Smith was eighteen years old (at a time when the age of majority was
twenty-one years of age), self supporting, and independent of his parents. The court held that
he could give a valid consent to the surgery, provided that a full disclosure of the consequence
of the surgery was made in comprehensible terms by the physician. Id. at 723. The Smith
case appears to be authority for giving a minor, emancipated upon marriage, the legal capac-
ity to consent to sterilization. However, in those states which emancipate minors for the
treatment of pregnancy, the performance of a sterilization operation may be excluded from
the services for which a minor may give effective consent. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-137(7)(Cum.
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lization has been far less extensive than on either abortion or contracep-
tion. The litigation which does exist is centered around the granting of
federal family planning assistance ' 2r with the proviso that competent per-
sons below the age of eighteen can give effective consent to sterilization
operations. 124
The enforcement of that proviso was permanently enjoined by the fed-
eral district court in Relf v. Weinberger-15 because the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare had no statutory authority to "fund the steriliza-
tion of any person incompetent under state law to consent to such an
operation, whether because of minority or of mental deficiency."'' 6 When
the Secretary proposed a modification to the regulation which barred all
sterilization of persons under twenty-one years of age and persons mentally
incompetent under state law, the court in Relf v. Mathews ruled that the
new regulation would provide for sterilizations contrary to state law. The
present regulations reflect the Mathews decision as they provide that serv-
ices cannot be provided in contravention of applicable state laws.
Although the Supreme Court has not accorded fundamental status to
the right to sterilization, lower courts have indicated that this would be
an appropriate and logical extension of the right of privacy in obtaining
Supp. 1977). Where states lack legislation other than "mature minor" statutes and also lack
judicial decisions concerning sterilization, it appears that a sterilization operation could not
be performed without parental consent. Dunn, supra note 7, at 12.
123. Public Health Service Act, § 1007, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-5 (1970); Social Security Act
§§ 402(a)(15), 508(a), 1905(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 602(a)(15), 708(a), 1396d(a)(4) (1970).
124. The minor's decision to be sterilized was reviewed by a special committee which
determined whether the sterilization was in the best interest of the minor, but parental
consent was not required. 42 C.F.R. § 50.206(a)(b)(1, 2) (1974); 45 C.F.R. § 205.35(a) (4)(i) (A,
B) (1974); 42 C.F.R. § 50.203(c) (1974); 45 C.F.R. § 205.35(a)(5)(ii) (1974). These regulations
have since been revised. See note 127 and accompanying text infra.
125. 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974). The court noted that there was uncontroverted
evidence in the record that minors, incompetents, and poor people had been improperly
coerced into submitting to an involuntary sterilization operation under threats that federal
welfare benefits would be withdrawn if they refused the sterilization. Id. at 1199.
126. Id. at 1201. The Secretary could not demonstrate to the Weinberger court's satisfac-
tion that Congress deemed minors capable of voluntarily consenting to an "irreversible opera-
tion involving the basic human right to procreate." Id. at 1202.
127. 403 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1975). The court considered the proposed federal standard
of voluntariness and rejected it.The Mathews court was unwilling to enter an order which
would authorize the sterilization of minors contrary to state law; such an order would purport
to affect the rights of minors to later challenge "the intrusion upon their person on the ground
it was conducted in a manner inconsistent with applicable state law." Id. at 1239. The
Mathews court also felt the regulation should be considered through the rule-making process,
after publication in the Federal Register, so that it will be structured with due regard for the
views of the states.
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abortions which was recognized in Roe and Doe. 's In addition, the privacy
right in using contraceptives, which was articulated in Griswold, could be
extended to support the inclusion of contraceptive sterilization into that
fundamental right. 29 As the "distinction between the use of contraceptives
and the particular method chosen is not great,"'30 the right of privacy may
be deemed to include the right to select the desired method of contracep-
tion.
In view of the Supreme Court's decisions reflecting the existence of a
right to decide matters affecting childbearing, the right to sterilization
presents a direct conflict which must be resolved by the legislatures and
the courts. The abuses of inadequate safeguards have been well docu-
mented.'3 ' It is clear that if the federal government or the state is to pro-
mulgate regulations protecting either right, the regulations must express
a balance between those interests. 32
CONCLUSION
The recognition of a minor's constitutional right to privacy has greatly
increased the minor's access to medical services concerning reproductive
capacity and sexual activity. Courts and legislatures will continue their
attempts to define the limits in the extension of adult rights to minors. Yet
no unalterable lines can be drawn. For as Justice Brennan so aptly stated,
"[t]he question of the extent of state power to regulate conduct of minors
not constitutionally regulable when committed by adults is a vexing one,
perhaps not susceptible to precise answer."',"
Karen Henenberg
128. Hathaway v. Worchester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Mass. 1972), aff'd, 475
F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973); Doe v. North Ottawa Community Hosp. Authority, Civ. No. 2706
(Ottawa, Mich. Cir. Ct., May 15, 1973); Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574
(1975); Murray v. Vandevander, 522 P.2d 302 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974); see note 22 supra.
129. The Need for Regulation, supra note 114, at 89; see note 22 supra.
130. Id.
131. See generally Id.
132. Id. at 92.
133. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2020 (1977).
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